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Summa.ry 
ln the first part of the article th author analyzes the type of electoral 
system used to elect members of the House of Counties in the Sabor 
its essential dete.rminants and ~litical effects. The _proportional eleaoral 
symm did not produce the political effects expected frOm it. Proportional 
e]~oru in smaU constituencies returning lhiee members, like the ones 
in Croatia for the election of memben to the House of Counties, lead 
~o tht represem_ation goal of plurality electiol!S: ProportionaJu:y is 
IDCOmplete and differences occur between ihe pamapanon o votes and 
weight of votes in relation to seau. This works to the detriment of small 
paroes. The proportional cleao.ral system with three seats considerably 
favours lru-ge political parties. 
In the second part. of the article the amhor analvzes the resultS of 
the ections fur tHe House of Counties. They showed that althou2h the 
Crootian Democratic Union is still the leading md dominant poli "caT force 
·m an absolute parliamentary majority1 it is no longer only party 
with political power. In these elections me Croatian SOcial Liber.il P~ 
and the Croatian Peasant Party affirmed rhemselves as P.Oiitical parties 
with a dearly presented par:ty position and political stTellgili. The election 
results shoW a tendency o concenr:rarion m the pany system in which 
there will be room for our to live political parnrs. 
ln the third pan of the article the author p.re.senrs rh role of the 
House of Counties as a kind o su~rvisory SabOr body, but also a body 
throu~ which are expressed not onJy pany and poliocal, but especially 
regional interest:i and the specific fearures of inilividual counties. 
wroduccion 
The ftrst free multiparty elections and the constituting of th democratically 
elected Sabor (Parliament) of the Republic of Croatia in May 1990 began the 
process of democratic transition from authoritarian socialism towards multiparty 
parliamentary democracy. The new democratic Constitution of the Republic of 
· Elections for the Chamber of Counties of the Sabor were held on 7 February 
1993. 
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Croatia, enacted on 22 December 1990, established the legal Framework fnr 
the her development of democratic institutions and the new state and 
political order. The new Constitution fundamentally changed the structur of 
rhe Sabor, whose three chambers (House of Associated Labour, House of 
Communes and Sociopolitical Ho~e) were replaced by 1'\vO, I louse of Repre-
sentatives and House of Countit:s (Zupanije) . Furthermore, member of the two 
chambers of the Sabor are now elected directly (Constitution of the Republic 
of Croatia, Articles 70 and 7J). A new Law on the Election ofRepre eman'ves 
to the SaboT of the Repubh'c of Croatia was passed on 10 April 1992 so that 
elections could be held fo r the I louse of Representalives and House of Counties 
of Lhe Sabor, and the parliament reconstituted and reorganized (because rbe 
current Sabor had been eJected on lhe basis of the old Constirution accorcting 
to election laws valid at that time). This reorganization was left to the new 
democratically elected authorities. The constitutional foundation for the 
promulgation of lhis law is contained in Article 72, Paragraph 3, of the 
Constirution of lhe Republic of Croatia. 
The type of electoral system on which to base free democratic elections 
is of great importance both from the aspect of political representation and for 
the legitimacy and functioning of the political system itself. In the Republic 
of Croari.a a balance had ro be found between the Fragmented and tmprofiled 
party ystcm am.l aspirations to achieve a stable exccu.tivc government on th 
one hand, and on the other the requirement that the inreresrs of important 
political and social grourrs wilhin the parliam.enr should be represented. For 
this reason the choice o . eJcccoral model was a key issue for the democratic 
deve.lopmeru of modem Croatia. In almost all western democracies, and in 
cotmtries of South and East Europe that have passed or are passing through 
political and economic processes of transirion since the fall of toralilarian or 
authoritarian regimes, the type of electoral system used was a result of political 
compromise among th.e ruling parties and those in the opposition, or was based 
on referenda at which electors opted for the kind of electoral modeJ they 
wanted1• In Croatia, however, the ruling political party, the Croatian DemOCTaric 
Union, c..lominared the choice of c.Leaoral system and its configuration both for 
the elections held on 2 August 1992 and for lhose in February 1993.2 
1 Paul Wilder, The It.."llian Referendum on Electoral Reform, Reprt!sencaa'on, Summer, 
London, 1991, p. 22. At a referendum held on 18 and 19 April 1993 ltalian voters 
decided on changes in the. elecloraJ system. on flUallcing political parties and some 
other issues imporornt for changes in the regime. The Irish decided Olli changes in me 
eJectoral system at a referendum held in 1959. 
Richard Gunther, Electorol Laws, Party Systems and Elections: The Case of Spain, 
American Polllical Science Review, 1989, Volume 83, o. 3, pp. 835..SS8. 
1 In the words of Smiljko Soko1, one of the aut.hors of rbe elecroral system, ~i t 
is not rrue that this system is tailored only in the interest of me CDU, because then 
the elections would be by relative majority where the CDU would have won 90 per 
cent seats". From an interview of Smiljko Soko\ \rj the journalist Miljenko Manjkaz: 
"\'od\mo \o\tvats\ru prema Svedskoj", (We arc leading Croatia towards Sweden), Danas, 
12 Februacy 1993, o 6/ 93 , Zagreb, pp. 6-7. 
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Th Croarian electoral model, eslablishcd by rh Law on the Elecnon o 
Representatives in lbc Pl:!IIiamenc (Sabnr) ol tiJe Republic of Croada, is a 
combinaLion of two differenr ryp of electoral system: rhe plurality and the 
proporriona l systems, and is caUed the combined plurality~proportionol elecrora} 
system. Article 22 of this law prescribes that 124 membcr!j shal l be elected 
mto lhc House of Representatives o the Sabor (the fir t chamber of the Croatian 
parliam nt). This number can be increased in accordance with conditions set 
fonh .in Article 26 of the Elecmral J.aw. Since members are el cred into the 
House of Represenrarives on _the b?Sis ~f two types of ele~oral systems, Lhe 
La~ defines r.vo types of consutucn 1 . S1xry members of parliament are elecred 
according to the proportional sysrem (Article 24) for which the whole territory 
of lhe Republic of Croatia is one constituency. There is a prohibitive iau.se 
of 3 per t, a closed list and t.l Hondt's merhod i used for transforming vores 
inro seats. The remaining sixty-four members of parliament are leered in 
uninominal cunsticuendes that elect one m mber into rh House of 
Represemarives by relative plurality ('Tm>t past rhe post") . Four of lhese are 
e lecr d by members of specific national minoriti s in special constituencies 
established by the Cunstiruency l.aw. 
Elections for the House of Representatives, which has 138 members 
(according to me Consriruti.on, Article 71, it may have a mjnimum of 100 and 
a maximum o 160 members) were held on 2 August 1992 according m the 
mixed electoral sysrem.) These w re the second• democratic, free.. multiparty 
elections but rh first in a sovereign, im.lependem, democratic and 
internationally recognized Republic of Croaria. 
Howev r. elKtions for t:lre Hou of Counties, the second chamber of the 
Croatian parliament (' hich are treared here), w re not held at lh same rim 
as elections for the House of Repr entarives (2 Augusl 1992). They could no 
be held until the R public of Groatia had been t.Jjvided inro counti s (iupan[jc), 
which had at that time not yet been carried our. A solution was found in 
postponing the county elections to enable, in h months that followed the 
constitution of the House of Representatives, a suitable solution to be found 
for lhe new. territorial organization of the Rcpublk of Croatia and irs division 
into coundes (ZupanJje), in pla<:~ of the earlier co.mmunal system. Th.e 
Constitutional Law passed after the elections in the sununcr of '92 empowered 
lhc House of Represenratives to discharge t.hc constinrrional role or the Hous 
of Counties until its conslitution. 
1 Stefica Deren Antoljak. The Croarian Electoral Model, Its Most lmpotTant Elemenrs 
(1992 Elections), Croati11n Policical Sci~CL! Review, 1.1 1992, Zagreb, pp. 100-124. 
• The first free multiparty elections for the representative bodies of municipalities 
and the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia were held In spring 1990 based on the Law 
on the EJection and Reca 11 of Councilors and Representatives (NN no 7/90) . These were 
absolul'e majoriry (rwo-round) type elections applied Lo the old Sabor structure with 
three chambers, based on unequal electoral righrs. Thar model was selected bearing 
in mind the ex~c:r.ed otdvantages of the majority system, i.e. the concentration of political 
p31ti s, the formation of a parliamentary party m~ority and a stable one-party 
gove.mm nt. In the pasl two years, however; the functioning of the Croatian Sabor 
and gove.mment did nor fu1fill what the crearors of lhe electoral law had expecred, 
so it was d.ectded to change the electoral system. 
83 
r rhe end of 1992 rh l.aw on tlw Territories of che Counn'e · (Zupmlfj :), 
Cities and unicipaliiics in the Republic of Croat..ia (Narrxine novine no. 0, 
30 December 1992) was passed, which provid d the legal foundation or holding 
elec ons for members of rhe Ho c of Counties. The ele.crions were called for 
7 February 1993. This law defines the l"'unl.ies primarily as units of local 
govemmenr but also of self-govemmenr, capable of acting as natural elf· 
governing entities within the framework o a single and indivisible Croatian 
stare. llowever, they are also electoral w1ils from which members are clccLed 
Lo the House of Counties. During their con.~titution care was taken to make 
rhe counties an expression of the historical, communications and economic 
imer; t of a region. On the basis of these elements, and on area and nwnbcr 
of inhabiran , the law divided me Republic of Croatia into £Wem:y counties; 
the Cicy of Zagreb which has the sratus o the twenty-first county; and £WO 
disrricrs wim special self-government ~tatus, Knin and Glina . These districts are 
territoriaUy divided between rwo counries: the District of Glina is parr of Sisak 
County and the Disrrict of Knin parr of Zadar-Knin County. 
Basic determinanrs of tlJc electoral sysrem by which members of the House 
of Counties were eleaed, and political effecrs 
The fl.rst text o the Law on the Elettion o members of the House of Gounti 
divided counti s into d\r; constituencies, each of whkh was to elect one 
member by the system of relative plurality. However, a month b fore elections 
for the House of Counties, at a session of rhe House of Representatives (5 
January 1993), the el croral law was changed from a relative plurality inro 
a proportional electoral system, in spite of opposition disagreement. Counlies 
were no longer divided into three consr:iruenci and instead the whole terrirory 
of a county became a ingle constituency. The parry rhat won at tlre August 
'92 elections, th CDU, probably changed the electoral system because it judged 
that a proportional system with three seats was bc::ue.r suited t irs political 
int rests, eypecting as great a victory as thar of August '92. The team of experts 
(Vladimir Seks, Smiljko Soko~ Ivka Crnit) explained chis change of electoral 
syst m by the need to achl ve srable e1teculive rule and the constitutional need 
by which it was considered more logical for a whole county to orm a single 
constiluency from which three members would be elected representing all the 
or r in the c UJtty, no only some of them. They considered the proportional 
system better for an uneven number of members. Only several months earlier 
the Learn o. f e:xpens had used these same arguments ro explain the advanr.age:s 
of the relative plurali.ty ele:c::rmal system. The op~ition parties were for an 
absolute plurality electoral system (in two rounds) for th.e House of Counties 
elections. Some of mem formed elecri.on coalitions and a common county list, 
others, like the Croatian Party of Rights, decided m boycott the elections. All 
the opposition parties voted against the electoral solutions offered, but the CDU's 
absolute parliamentary plurality greatly bmits the opposition's political influence. 
Three key questions dominated the Sabor discussion abom changes in lhc 
electoral system for the House of Counties: type of electoral system, the 
compositiun of electOral comnrissions, and who can be the bearer of a county 
1 The Republic of Croalin has 4 million 780 thousand inhabirans. 
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list. CDU domination engineer-ed the chan e in electoral system from relative 
plurality lo proportional. Concerning rhe composition o electoral commi ions, 
the ruling party did not yield ro opposition demands for multipany commissions 
saying that both solutions were democratic, but rhat rhe one that h d been 
suggesLed first was technically simpler ro implement. The Sabor members, mo r 
of them CDU members, accepted only one of the amendments put orward 
by the opposition, the one thal the Republican Ell!' oral Commission should 
choose a printing house to print ballot papers marked with serial numbers. 
All other opposition demands were rejected ~ The third question under dispute 
concerned those bearing the county li.sLS. The solution accepted in the Sabor 
was that well-known "political" figures could be bearers of county lists bur need 
not stand for rhe House of Counties. Even a person who had a sear in the 
House of Representatives, bur who e mandate was in abeyance because he had 
in the meantime been elected to an office incompatible with that of member, 
could be the bearer of a list. This was done to enable well-known parry gure,s 
t.o be includ don p:arty lil.n to win as many vo es as possible, and lhcn appoint 
their deputy. This would not have been possible if elections for both the hous 
had run paralleJ. 
An electoral system consists of many different elemenrs, mosr imponant 
being the fonnstion of constituenci~ 1:e.. their ize, vodng scruau.re. procedure 
of transforming voces inro 'I!Bt:S and the prohibitive d;zusc (threshold). Each 
of these elements in itself, or in combination with others, is known to have 
a political effect on election results. Under specific circumstances, the elements 
of an electoral sysrem influence rendendes in the political and party system. 
Research shows that electoral results do not depend only on votes cast by voters 
but also on electoral rules laid down in the electoral law. 
In type, rhe Law on the Election of Members of the House of Counties in 
Croatia establishes proportional eleccions. In proportional elections in ltuge 
constituencies, it is a role of dedsion-makingthat seats arc distributed according 
to the participation of votes won by candidates or a parry, which allows the 
pwportional representation of political parties in a parliament. Under such 
conditions the rule of decision-making Leads to the representatifJnal goal of 
proportional elecobns.. The aim of proportional clc tions is the faithful 
representation of the social forces and political groups rhat exist in a society. 
Participation in votes and participation in seats should coincide as far as possible. 
This is the main function of dl! principle of representation and the cale for 
evaluating the proportional electoral system. 
In proportional elections in smaU constituencies (like the ones that existed 
in Croatia for the election of memben of the House of Counties) with three 
seatx, decision-making through proportion leads to lhe representational goal 
of plurality elections. In small constituencies there are great differences between 
participation 1n votes and participation in seats, to the detriment of small parties. 
Proportionality is incomplete because it involves only a few seats (in our case 
only three) . Large parties are privileged ro the disadvantage of small parlics. 
This makes the division i11to constituendes, i.e. the size of constituency, the 
most important element of the electoral sysrem, determining the electoral 
chances of political parties and influencing election results the most directly. 
Deren.-Anlor)ak, S., El<>cticn! In Croalla - .. CPSfl. Vol. 3D. No. ~ . 1993, ~- IIG-11 0 85 
Con tiru~ncies should be equal to ensme equal weight ro the votes of all vorers 
and thus uphold lhc principle of equality. It is a democratic principle that each 
vote must have rhe same nwne ical value. 
1\s has already been said, Croatia was territorially divided into twenty 
counries and the City of Zagreb, on constituency corresponding to one county. 
However, the counties are not equal either in territory or in number of 
inhabitants. There is a great difference in number of voters between the largest 
and rhe smallest county. ln the 1993 elections for the House of CoWlties the 
constituency with most voters was the City of Zagreb (the 21st county) with 
715,n2 reg:i.st~red vorers, and the smallest the Lika-Senj Counry with 47,761 
regi tered voters, which is a. ratio of 1:15. This division seriously devalues nor 
only the pni1ciple of proportional elections as a principle of representarion bur 
also the principle of equal electoral rights. There are great differences in number 
of vorers between the Splir-Dalmatian (360,752), Primorje-Gorski Korar 
(261,158) and Osijek-Baranja _ (256,075) Counties on one hliDd, and the 
VlCovitica-Podravina (70,945), Sibenik (79,954) and Poiega-Slavonia (86,946) 
Counties on the other. In fonning the counties constitutional guidelines were 
borne in mind according o which the area of a county is detennined so that 
it is the expression of historical, traffic and communication as well as economic 
facwrs and that it represents a natural self-government whole in the framework 
of the Republic of Croatia in which citizens can realize common interests, order 
affairs of the infra-structure relevant for the territory of the county and 
coordinate views on issues dectded on by l.he bodies of the Republic of Croaria. 
They were not formed on the basis of number of inhabitants (or voters) in 
a certain area so that more or less the same number of inhabitants would elect 
one representative. 
The El croral Law prescribed plurinomin;ll constituena"es with three sears 
for elections into the House of CoWJties, regardless of the number of registered 
vol~ or number of citizens. This created the foundation for a significan 
departure from the principle of equal vote validity. A vote in the smallest 
constitu~ncy, the Lika-Senj Counry, :·weighed" almo~t fifteen times more th~ 
a vote m the mosr populous constituency - the C1ty of Zagreb. -DemocratJc 
principles call on every vote to be of equal value. This equaliry is realized when 
the same nwnber of people (or voters or, more rarely, valid votes cast) on 
the whole cl ctoral territory achieve the same number of seatx. F..quicy is realized 
if the uwnber of members elected in each consl.ituency is proportional to the 
toral number of voters. 
The division and size of constituencies in Croatia resulted in inequality in 
representation based on number of voters, giving an advantage to smaller 
consl.iluenc.ies, i.e. counties with a relatively small number of voters. ln the 
1993 eleaions for the House of Counties there was one member of parliament 
(seat) for every 15,920 registered voters in the Lika-Scnj County, and one 
member of parliament (scat) for every 238,591 registered voters in the City 
of Zagreb, which was a ratio of 15:1 in favour of the Lika-Senj County. This 
disproportion has a great effect on representation, and is augmented by the 
geo-graphical division of constituencies and the distribution of political parties. 
ln small cons.tituen_cies reruming three members, like the ones in Croatia, there 
is no relative proportion between votes and seatS as there is in large 
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consriUlencics. This gives an advantage to political parties that tlominatc in 
a sufficient number of small anJ medium constituencies. 
ConslituenCJ' size i a very important clement of the electoral system . It 
does not mean sil.e o terriLOry bur number of members of parliament el cred 
in a con tiruency. Constituency size anJ thee eeLS of proportionality are directl 
connected, which means that Lhe effectS of proporrionalily depend on 
constituency size. Disproportion is the greatest in small constituencies6. Research 
shows that the smaller a constituency, the small r the effectS of electoral 
proportionality, and thus also the chances of small parties to win scars. 
Constituencies returning three members, lik those in CroaLia for the House 
of Counties elections, ate con idered small in electoral theory. which considers 
con tiruencies with between 2 anJ 5 representatives small. A5 we said earlier, 
the number of representatives elected in a constituency can in certain cases 
decisively influence the effecrs of an el ctoral ~ystem. 
In the 1993 elections (fur th.e House of Counties) the Croatian Democratic 
Union ared be r in the smallest constituency, rhe Lika-Senj Counry, winning 
74.69 per cent votes. ElecroraJ disproportion was expressed by the CDU winning 
an absolure parliamentary plurality of sears, i.e. 58.73 per cent, with 45.49 
per cent votes. TJlis again gave it Lhe position of rhe dominant political party. 
The proportional electoral system u ed in Croaria for Lhe I louse of Counties 
elections openly contradictS the principle of equal electora l rights in democratic 
elections because of unequal represemation based on voter disrributioa. The 
political effect of rhis type of proportional system is the advantage of the largest 
political party and the concentration o power in its hands. Secondly, it resulted 
in a parliamentary plurality based on a relative pluralicy of vot rransforme.d 
into an absolute plurality of sears. In spite of election rcsuJrs, the oth r rwo 
political parties, the Croa ·an Social Liberal Party and the Craatian Peasant Party, 
do not seriously threaten the CDU. At the present moment the Croatian party 
system does not allow the al emation o partic in power. 
In the House of Counti - elections voters had to choose among lists drawn 
up by political parties. The writers of rhe electoral law decided on ngid or 
closed lists that do not allow voters ro express preferenfes among candidates 
on a party usr but must vote for the list as a whole. Eac.h voter has only one 
vote and electoral coalitions on the le-,el o constiruency -are allowed. 
Lists of candidates that won at leesr 5 per cenr votes in a constituency 
panic!pate in sear distribution. The prohibitive dause is contrary to the principle 
of equitable political representation but sti.mula e.s party concentration, Le. it 
counters the dispersion of the parry system. The corrective character of the 
5 per cent prohibitive clause in the House of Counties elections is diminished 
because the mall three-sear constiruencies de e:r smaller partieS from winning 
seats in any case. 
The procedure of rranslonning votes into seats is also an important factor 
influencing election results and the c.Mnces of political parties. Along with the 
di~sion of the country into constiruencies, this is considered to be the most 
6 Douglas W. Rae, Th~ Political Consequences of ElectorBI Laws, ew Haven, 1971 . 
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rmporranr element of an elecrion system. In the House of Counries lections 
votes were transfonned into sea s (according to the Elecrion Law) by Lhe 
d'Hondt m erhod. This method of rran forming votes into seats is known ro 
favour large parties more than other procedur s. The d'Hondt me hod can 
sometimes gi e a large party one s t more ro the dis dvanrage of a smaller 
party. For ex-ample, by the d'Hondr method the CDU won 2 seats in the Zagreb 
County and the CPP one . a . However, had the procedure of elecrora.l number 
(the quota procedur ) with the method of the greatest remnant or the method 
of dividing rhe remnant been used, the CDU would have got one scat, th 
CPP one seat and the CSLI' one seat.l Transforming votes into sears according 
to one or the orh r method shows that the differences in pecific cases are 
minimal and that in indi idual counties (conslituenci ) one party can ger a 
maximum of one seat from another party. In rh Sisak-Mm;lavina Councy the 
CDU got two sears and the CSLP one, regardless of whether me d'Hondt or 
the Hare m thod is used . In l.his cas the effe t is the same. The ad antage 
of rhe d'Hondt mclhod is irs simplicity. 
The 1993 elections for the I louse of Counries showed bias. All the parties 
needed more votes to win one seat than the CDU. The CDU "paid" less votes 
for one sear than any other pany (excep in the !stria County, where the lOP 
W' privileged in the same way). Th.e "price" of a seat in number of vor 
for panies that participat d in the division of seats was as follows: IDP = 25.424 
votes for one sear; CDU = 27,388 vore for one seat; CSLP = 34,585 votes 
for one seat; CPP = 51.790 votes for one seat. These results show that bias 
was on the side of the CDU (in lstria the 1DP) w the disadvantage of the 
CSLP and especially the CPP whlch, as the 'third" party, had m pay" the highest 
"price" in vores per seat. Although bias appears in only ome electoral sy.;rems. 
mo rly in plurality and very rarely in proportional elections (and the elections 
for the House of Counties are proportional), in this case bias resulted from : 
1. small consriru ncies (returning .three members), 2. d'llondr's method of 
transfonn ing vores into seats, 3. rhe participation of third and founh parrie 
in some constituencies, 4. gerrymandering.& Tn this case gerrymandering 
primarily resulted from the fact that the constituencies were counties in which 
three repr r.arives were elected regardless of the number of voters registered. 
This also resulted in the fact that the political representaLion of som social 
groups or parries in some counlics-constiruencies was increased, and in other 
limited. In any case, the political effect of the proportional electoral system 
wirn three seats is biased in favour of one party, which results from special 
conditions in me electoral system. 
Results of elecrions for the House of Counties 
Elections for the llous of Counlies of the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia 
(and those held on the san1e day for county assemblies, city and municipal 
councils), held on 7 February 1993, ended the constirurion of the new bodies 
1 The Hare method with the addition of me remnant using the principle o greate.U 
.remnant would hav given rhe GDU 33 mandates instead of the 37 it got usmg rhe 
d'Hondr method; rh CSLP would have _got 20 sets instead of 18, the CPP 7 instead 
of 5, and rh IDP · 2 instead of the 3 n gor. 
1 Cercymandering is a politicaUy biased division into constilUenc:ies. 
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o independent Croatia prescribed by the Constitution of rhe R public o Croatia. 
bicameral parliamentary structure was fu lly formed when the Rouse of 
Counties was constituted. 
The Elecroral Commission o the Republic of Cro lia reporred on me final 
o cial election results: a toral or 3,580,396 voters were registered in lh 
electoral rolls, 2,303, 782 or 64.34 per cenr vored. This is 11.27 pcr cenr smaller 
voter participation than in the elections held in August 1992 or the House 
o Representatives (the flTSt chambcr of the Croatian parliament), which had 
be n 75.61 per cent. lt is important ro emphasize that voter participation on 
the county level varied from 31 per cent to 81 per cent. lr wa relatively low 
only 31 per cent, in the Z uar-Knin Counry, 51 per c.enr in the Sisak-Moslavina 
County and 55 per cent in the Osijek-Baranja County. Voter participation was 
highest in the Virovitica-Podravina County (81 per cent) , rhe Bjelovar-Bilogora 
County (80 per cent) and the Zagreb County (78 per cent) . In the City of 
Zagreb (which has the status of twenty-first county), the largest urban centre 
of the Republic of Croatia, voter participation was 68 per cent (see table in 
the supplement). 
The pronounced decrease of voter participation., 11.27 per cent in comparison 
with the August 1992 elections, is no cause for concern considering the 
circumstances in which the elec ions were held: a rare of neither war nor 
complete peace, Croatia's political and constitutional-legal system not yet 
functioning on the whole area of the rerublic because of the cruel and brutal 
Greater-Serbian aggression and many o the displaced rill not living in their 
homes. The reasons for electoral abstinence can only be guessed at because 
rhere has been no reliable research on the subject. Several factors eern o 
have primarily contributed, one was the uninteresting elect raJ campaign in 
which only some parties participated and orhers did not take an active part 
because they could not cover the costs. Voters also stayed at home on election 
day because they believed that the opposition was weak and divided and because 
they believed that politicians make promises ey do not hold. Voters arc much 
more than marginally intuested in elections and politics, but they expressed 
their dissatisfaction by absraining because or the bad economic and social 
situation. dissatisfaction with the way in which privatization was being managed 
and with the degree of democracy in the media.. Citizens of the Republic of 
Croatia who temporarily work abroad did not vote in rhe February 1993 
elections because one of the conditions for voting was place o residence, and 
th electoral rolls had no yet been completely updated. In lh August 1992 
elections they voted only for representatives on state lists, but they could not 
vote in the small constituencie in which the second group of representatives 
was elected. However, their response in the summer of 1992 was not especially 
great. 
Of the twenty-six political parties that put forward county lists for the election 
of representatives into .the I louse of Counties (see list of parties al the end 
of this article) and the six independent candidates (so-called independent county 
Usts), at the end of the electoral process only six political parties entered the 
second parliamentary chamber, i.e. the 63 members elected belong to six parties. 
The strongest and the ruling political party, the CJ;oatian Democratic Union 
(CDU), won a convincing vicrory getting 37 seats -(45.49 per cent votes) of 
89 
the total of 63 members elected into rhe House of Coun.ti~. The CDU ensured 
not only a pluraliry in the House o Rcpres ntatives (85 o the total number 
of 138 memb rs) , but also a plurality in rhe House of Counties (37 of 63 clc(.ted 
members). 
The second party, the Croatian Social Liberal Party (CSLP), won 18 ears 
or 27.94 per cenr votes alone or in coalition. However, on the basis of coalition 
agrecmenrs the CroaUan National Party got one of these seats and d1e Party 
of D mocratic Change another, o the CSLP ended up with 16 seats. The third 
was the Croarian Peasant Parry (CPP) with 5 seats or 11.61 per cem votes; 
then followed the /stnan Democratic Parliament (IDP) with three seats or 3.42 
per cent votes, the Sodalist Parry of Croatia - Party of Democratic Cilange (PDC) 
with one s.ea (in coalition wirh the CSLP in lhe Brod-Posa ina Cowuy) and 
the Croatian National Parry (GNP) wim one sear (in coalition with me CSL.P 
in the Medimurje County). From the aspect of voter suppon the strength of 
the other political parties is almost negligible (9.18 per cent). 
The Constitution of the Republi of Croatia lays down that 1ve more 
members will enter the House of Counties when it is constitu ed, nominated 
by the President of the Republic from among "citizens especially meritorious 
for the Republic", probably according to rhe criterion of prominence, profes-
sionalism and esteem. When his renn in office ends, if be o wishes, the 
President of t.he Republic becomes a member of the House of Counties for 
life (Article 71 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia). This means that 
the second chamber of the Croalian parliament (House of Counties) today has 
a total of 68 members with full rights and ob~ations. In Article 59 of rhe 
Italian Constitution' the President of the Republic can similarly name up to 
five citizens as senators for life in the enate, the second chamber of the Italian 
parliament, from among persons who are the most meritorious for contributions 
ro their country in the social, scholarly, anistic and Hrerary fields. 
A comparison of election results for the House of Counties held in February 
1993 with election results for the House of Representatives held in August 1992 
shows that the CDU won 1,176,000 votes in the August elections and 1,013,356 
vores in the Pebruary 1993 elections, which means that ir won 162,635 votes 
less in February 1993. However, because of decreased voter participation it 
managed not only to keep the percentage of votes that ilS state list won for 
the House of Representatives in August 1992 (43.72 per cent), it even won 
1.77 per cem votes more (45.49 per cenr) . With a relative pluraJity of votes 
(45.49 per cent) the CDU ensured an absolu[e plurality of seats (58.73 per 
cent or 37 of the total of 63 seats). The absolute plurality of CDU seats is 
not the result of an absolute pluraliry of votes bur of the electoral system, 
or to be more precise, its disproportiooal effect (that is why it is called a 
manufactured plurality, as opposed to an earned plurality) . 
The Croacian Social liberal Party (CSLP) and the Croatian Peasant Party 
(CPP) came to expression in elections for the House of Counties. Borh of their 
election results were above what had been expected. Voter participation for 
the liberals gr; w from 17.33 per cent in 1992 to 27.94 per cent in February 
• Costituzion~ ~la Repubblica Jt1Jluna, p. 11, An. 59. 
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1993, wh1ch convincingly made them the second larly in strength ;md the 
strongest opposition party on rhe Croatian potirica cene. 
The greatest jump, however, Y.<aS made by the O varian Peasanr Party (CPP}, 
which came sixrh in the August eb:tion with 4.16 per cenr votes to reach 
third plac in February 1993 wilh 11.62 per cenr vole:.. This me.an that ir 
more [han doubled i August electoral result , which makes it th real icror 
of rhe House of Counties elections. It is important to emphasize that the CPP 
did not enrer any of the coalitions that had be n offered ir hy other opposition 
parties, conscious not only thar its strength was growing but lllso that it was 
gaining increased respc(.1: among voters. 
The inOuence o regional parties ~rew somewhat but it is nor high on the 
national level, especially if we bear m mind thar their strength is at present 
limited ro lstria In rhe lsrrian County th Jsrrian Dcmocradc Parli3mMt (IDP) 
won all the three seaLS i.e. 66.42 per cent votes on the level of that county. 
The increase in the number of CSLP and CPP votes expresses changes in 
type of voter suppon and party lies, which led to political re-grouping in the 
eleclordre. Instead of the former dispersion of votes among a large number 
of parties, the House of Coun ties elections showed a concentration of voces 
~o in m~st cases. ~cc party lists, cspecia!ly in some counties. P.sychology played 
1ts part m the eliminanon of smaller parttes, because voters esnmatcd rhat votes 
given to the fourth or some other weaker party that has no real chance o 
winning are in fa.ct lost, so they rat..ionally decided ro vote for one of lhe large 
parties. This conscious voting for a candidate or party thar is noL the voter's 
ftrst pr erencc is called strategic, sophisticated or even in incerc voring which, 
however, might be the best rarional strategy to avoid the worst possible results. 10 
An analysis of results by county (constituency) s.hows that the Croatian 
DemOCflltic Union (CDU) list won most convincingly in the Lika-Senj County, 
winning all three seats or 74.69 per cent votes. The Groali.an Democratic Union 
won rwo seaLS in fifteen counties. It is interesting tu nore that it won two 
seats in the Iittoral-Gorski Kotar County, in which there were as many as nine 
party lists, although it was supported by only 35.40 per cenr voters. In the 
remaining four counties the CDU won one scat: in the Varazdin County (39.29 
per cent votes), th Kopri:vnica-Kriievci County (39.56 per cent), the Bjelov-.rr-
Bilogora County (44.06 per cent) and the Medimurje Country (33.07 per cent) . 
In comparison with the 1992 elections, CDU support grew somewhat in the 
Dubrovnlk-NereLva County (46.02 per c nt vores), and greatly in the Vukovar-
Srijem County {62.54 per cent, although voters · the status of displaced 
persons voted in places where their concentration was greatest, and in Zagreb) 
and in the Zadar County, wher CDU support reached 61.62 per cent, which 
is 13 per cent more than in the August 1992 elections. The Maslenica operation 
probably influenced the electorate's suppon for the CDU most directly. In the 
Sibenik County the CDU returned the support it had enjoyed ar the f1rst 
multiparty elections but had lost in the August 1992 elections because of vorer 
dissatisfaction wirh conditions on the from and the occupal..ion of parts of their 
to Rein Taagepera and Matthew Sopbe.rg Shugart, Sacs and Vo~ Th E/Tecr;s IID.d 
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terri tory. CDU suppon also grew slightly in the Zagreb County and in the County 
of the City of Zagreb because of a decrease of left-wing influence. The CDU 
lost votes to the Cruatian Peasant Parry in regions that had from the first 
multiparty elections until the August 1992 elections been CDU strongholds. ln 
lhc Krapina-Zagorjc County the CDU won a high 64.7 per cent votes in the 
summer 1992 elections, and in the 1993 elections it won only 58.53 per cent 
votes. The same happened in the Koprivnica-Krizevci (39.56 per cent) and the 
Virovitica-Podravina ( 49.35 per cenl) Counties. ln the Varai din (39.29 per cent) 
. and the Medimurje (33.07 per cenr) Counties the Croatian Democratic Union 
had poor results both in the first and the August elections, and in 1993 CDU 
support continued to decline, wherea') Croarian Peasant Parry suppon increased. 
The Croatian Social Libcral Pll.Ity (CSLP) won one seat in sixteen counties. 
rn rhe Medimurje County it was in coalition with the Croatian National Party 
(CNP) and they won two seats, each parry getting one. The CSLP increased 
ils percentage of voles in all the counties except the lstrian County. In rhe 
counties in which the CSLP won seats , irs percentage of votes varied from 21.87 
per cent in the Krapina-Zagorje County (coalition CSLP/ CNP/ PDC) Lo 42.17 
per cent in the Medin1Urje Cow1ty (coalition CSLP/ CNP) . ln the August 1992 
elections this percentage had been rather low - as a rule under 20 per cent. 
The liberals got significant suppon in some rural areas, and their support also 
grew in the larger towns. In the County of the City of Zagrcb they won 35.41 
per cent, in the ibenik County 30.14 per cent, in the Split-Dalmatian County 
28 .55 per cent, in the Sisak-Moslavina County 30.05 per cent, etc. 
The Croarian Democraric Union fared worst, winning only 16.35 per cent 
votes, in the lstrian Cotmty, which is a region of special interests and has ils 
own tradition. Bullhc result was, nevertheless, higher than it had been in August 
1992 (in three constituencies the CDU had won 9.8 per cent, 14.8 per cent 
and 13.1 per cent votes). The Croatian Social Liberal Party won 10.15 per 
cent votes in the lstrian County and d1e Croatian Peasant Party fell far behind 
with only 1.22 per cent votes. ln lstria the lstrian Democratic Parliament (lDP) 
won convincingly due to mass political voter mobilization, winning 66.42 per 
cent votes and all three seats. The IDP victory established the superiority of 
one political party leaving a very limited field for the work of other political 
parties. Dalmatian regionalists, unlike lstrian ones, were very far from winning 
a parliamentary seat. 
In counties in which it won a seat (Zagreb 29.51 per cent, Varazdin 25.14 
per cent, Koprivnica-KriZevci 31.64 per cent, Bjelovar-Bilogora 26.56 per cent 
and Virovitica-Podravina 27.59 per cent), the Croadan Peasant Party (CPP) won 
the support of over a quaner of the electorate and became serious competition 
for the CDU in rural areas in which a large number of the voters had 
convincingly supported the ruling party in previous elections. The Croatian 
Peasant Parry, however, did not win a single seat in the Krapina-Zagorje County, 
although it won 19.61 per cent votes. By forming a common county list three 
political parties, the CSLP/CNP/PDC, decreased voting dispersion and together 
won 21.87 per cent votes and one seat, which went to the CSLP. 
The Croatian Democratic Union lost part of its potential voters to the CPP, 
whose parliamentary position strengthened after thes.e elections and which 
became as an important political factor on the Croatian political scene. It is 
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no cenain who the mcmben and sympathizers of the Croatian Pany of Rights 
voted for al Lhcse elecrions, because thal party did not form irs own list for 
the Huuse of Counties. The ruling party derived certajn "ben ts" from the 
disunity and factioll.S in the Christ-ian Democrati opposition and il is supposed 
that some CDU votes came from those panies. CDU voter loss in . ome counties 
is believed to have gone to the CPP and CSLP, while some of the sympalhizers 
of opposition parties, lhe CNP, CPR and PCD, also voted for the CSI.P and 
CPP at these lections. 
At the August 1992 eJections the Croauan Democratic Patty and the Croalian 
Christian Democratic Party together won 4.2 per cent vores, at the February 
elections the CCDP won only 1.2 per c nt vote . At the county elections all 
the opposition Christian Democrats together won about 44,000 votes, which 
is three rimes less lhan in August. Some of lhc voters who had previously 
supponed tho c two political pa.rtie.s doubtlessly now switched to the Croatian 
Democratic Union, which is also a party of Christian Democratic orientation. 
The Crvarian Peasanr Party (CPP), which is the real victor of these eJections, 
was fresented as a reco Illzable pany through the ocial strara and the partial 
socia intere.sts it rcpresenrs. Bur ir is stiU in a process of organization. Although 
ir won most vo es in rural areas, it is important that it came third in vote.s 
won in rhe City of Zagreb (10.30 per c nt). This shows that, although it has 
the identity of a peasant party, farmers, agricultural workers and peasanrs a re 
not its only voters. It is al.so a party of owners, small landowners, craftsmen, 
entrepreneurs and all who were up ro now marginalizcd on the political scene. 
lr also aims to attrac rhe support of workers, office employees and rhe 
intelligentsia. The Croatian Peasant Party was built slowly as an independent 
political subject, but cry succes.sfully. greatly helped by i organization in the 
field and especially by the renewal of the Economic Concord, Peasant Concord, 
Agrarian-Crafts Bank, Savings-Credit Association and many other activities. By 
favouring multiparty parliamentary democracy, tolerance, dialogue and respect 
for the opinions of others, this party gained great respect and voter ~-upport. 
In the specrrurn of political P'arties on the Croatian political scene the Croatian 
Peasant Party is a party of the cent:re.11 
The Croatilli1 Social Liberal P;uty (CSLP) is also a party of the centre, 
although it has options of the "left and right centre". What differentia~es the 
CSLP from the CPP, and will probably go on differentiating them in the future, 
are the social strata and partial social interests the~ represent, not their 
programmes. Both parties have similar political p(~g:rarnme.s and views. The 
Croatian Social Liberal Party is not a social-democratic party either in 
programme or in membership. It is increasingly becoming a party supported 
and voted for by younger, educated, predominantlY. urban, middle social strata, 
although rural areas also supponed it in these elections. 
The Croati1111 Democratic Union is lhe largest, best organized, rerritorially 
most widespread and richest political party with strong social and political 
connections in the eleclorate, from the intelligentsia and urban dwellers m 
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peasants and worker both in Croatia and abroad (so-called migrated Croatia) . 
However, i . is ro be expected that the Croatian Democratic Union, which 
successfully developed as a Croatian national, democratic, state-building, ma , 
non-violenr, anti-Communist movement, will be transformed inro a modern 
political party of Christian Democratic orientation. The Croarian Democratic 
Union played an essential rol in over-throwing rhe rotalitarian regime, in 
pursuing an uncompromising policy of emergence from Yugoslavia, in the 
struggle for the creation of an independent state and in efforts for international 
recognition and the acceptance of the Republic of Croatia in the United Nations, 
which certainly played an essential role in the political will of most of the 
Croatian electorate to support ir and ensure it:s vi tory in rh first, second and 
third elections. All he political parties dlat emerged ar thar historic momenr 
were unanimous in their desire to crea.re an independent Croatian rate. And 
rhar desire to create national state, which was born in war and in resistance 
ro the brutal and cruel Grearer Serbi.an aggression, demanded national unity. 
However, roday, when that stale has been created and internationally 
r cognized, a.lthough not yet liberated, rational voter interests are coming to 
expression more and more. This was shown in the 1993 elections. Although 
still the leading and dominant force, the Croatian Democralic Union is no longer 
the only party with political power. The Croatian Social Liberal Party and the 
Croatian Peasant Party have after these elections been affirmed as political 
parties with a clearly defined party po ition and political strength. and they 
\vill have a decisive influence on the course of future policy, the advancement 
of democratic political life and the creation of a modem Croatia. In one word, 
the results of the 1993 elections for tile House of Counties of the Sabor showed 
a tendency of profilation in the party system in which there will be room for 
four to five political parties. 
In these elections, too, the electoral decline of Croaoa's democraoc left 
continued. Election resulrs show that th electnrate does not want an ultra-
right Cro.aria nor an ideology of exueme na ·onalism. However, political 
grouping in Croatia should tend mwards the European multipany liberal· 
democratic model with rOCim for a democratic left centered around a 
socialdemocraric orientation and similar ro the modem left in countries of 
northern and western Europe. Marginalized and disunited, in Croatia the left 
has one single allcmative for survival. The programatically identical left political 
parties, who all share the same basic pnociples and have a common social 
foundation, should unify with the purpose of creating a strong political 
organization of socialdemncra ·c orientation. Similar unification should take 
place between Christian Democrats and parties that suppon the rightist Party-
of-RightS political option. If these related political parties do not unite, some 
of them m y disappear after rhe House of Counties elections. 
Croatian politica.l parties developed at dle historic momenr when the old 
regime was overthrown, i.e. during the fall of communism on one hand and 
rhe ctisintegration of Yugoslavia and a struggle for Croatian independence on 
the other. Typical for the binh and development of Croarlan politic.al parties 
is that rhey were not dle expression of a developed social st:ructure in a civil 
ociery composed o a grea number of differem social groups and _strata 
dominated by private ownership, rhe market economy and dle funcl.iorung of 
a stare governed by the rule o law. Therefore, il is still no clear which social 
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strota poliLical parries in Croatia represent. The elections showed rhat political 
polarizarion does not comdde with the basic social polarization in Croaua, i.e. 
rhat political parties (except the CPP) are not yet rooted in the Croatian social 
structure. Thus, for example. rhe Croatian Democratic Union, as a party of the 
centre and of a Christian orientation, has srrong social and political connections 
in the electorc1te from the intelligentsia and the urban population to the peasants 
and workers, in one word, socially and economically diverse social strata tend 
to cohere around it. Furthermore, it is important to emphas.ize that there is 
no institutionalized connection among individual political parties and rrade 
unions in spire of the fact that rhere are several trade-union cr:ucres in Croatia. 
These links do not exisr because parties do not yet have a sufficiently 
recognizable social basis and it seems that at this moment rrade unions cannot 
yet sec which political party they could cooperate with. However, with the 
creation of a modern sociery, a state governed by the rule of law, private 
ownership and the market economy, polirical forces will regroup and parties 
will be formed on the Croatian polirical scene based on the W~1:-F.uropean 
model. 
The Role of the House of Counaes of the Sahor 
AJtho\.lgh the Croarian Sabor is bicameral, this is not classkal bicamerality 
in which the chambers are equal. Differences between the House of 
Representatives and the House of Counties result from the competence of the 
chambers and their method of election. The House of Counties has special 
constitutional competence not enjoyed by the House of Representatives, and 
vice versa. The House of Counties cloes nor have the rigbc of dedsioJNmiking 
and passing laws, but is a kind of sllpe!Vising (concrol) parh'amentary body. 
A$ such it plays an important role in parliamentary fimctioning, although it 
is the House of Rcpre.senratives that dcddes on all issue:; in rhe competence 
of the Sabor. Articles 81, 121 and 122 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Croalia show that several groups of affairs are in me competence of the 
House of Counties. FJISt, rhe House of Counties has the right to propose laws 
lO me House of Representatives and calf a referendum (initiative function, 
Article 81 of the Constitution) . Second, it has d1c right to discus:; and may 
give opinions on questions falling within the competence of the House of 
Representatives. ll may but need :10t discuss any law, elections and 
appoimments. The opinion of House of Counties members is not binding 
although lhe House of Representatives must hear it. The House of Counties 
must give the House of Representatives pdor opinion in the procedure of passing 
(or amending) the Constitution and laws that regulate national rights, elaborate 
constitutionally determined freedoms and the rights of man and the citizen, 
the electoral system, the organization, responsibilities and operation of 
govcmmenr bodies and the organization of local self-government and 
adminisrration (Article 81). However, the most important right of the House 
of Counties (legally and polirically) is the right of suspensive veto of all the 
laws passed by the House of Representatives. The House of Counties may, within 
a period of 15 days from the date when a law is passed in the House of 
Representatives, with a substantial opinion return the law for fresh 
consideration. ln other words, it returns laws for fresh consideraa·on to rhe 
House of Representatives. Jn that case the House of Representatives must vote 
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on such a law again but this time wi th a pluraliry of :J/1 rhe members in r:he 
House of Representatives, unless it is a 13w passed by a two-thirds plurali ty. 
It is important to stress that laws (except organic laws) are passed by a plurality 
of all the members present, on condition that ar least one half of the total 
number of members of rhe House of Representatives is present at the session11 . 
Three very important rights connected to the activities and formation of 
the judiciary are also in the field of competence of the House of Counties. 
It proposes to the House of Representatives the ll judges of the Constitutional 
Court (Article 122), which means that the House of Representatives cannot 
chose as Constitutional Court Judge any person that was not proposed by rhe 
House of Counties. Furthermore, the House of Counties proposes and the House 
of Represenrarives elects rhe president and members of the High Judiciary 
Council of the Republic. In conformity with the Constitution (Article 121) , the 
High Judiciary Council appoints and relieves judges and public prosecurors and 
decides on questions concerning their disciplinary responsibilities. 
Although it is not the decision-making chamber, the House of Counties is 
a body in which representatives of dle counties can express and f01m (because 
of its election foundation) the regional inlcrcsls of voters and the specific 
features of the counties concerning all quesrions decided on in the House of 
Representatives of the Sabor. As in other bicameral parliaments, the House of 
Representatives slows down the legislative procedure and through mclhod.s of 
control ensures and influences the quality of the laws passed. 
12 Today the majority of all the representatives in the House of Representatives is 
70, since the chamber ha.s 138 representatives, whereas the smaller majority quorum 
is 36 representatives. For laws that concern questions the Constitution demands a two-
thirds majority. Suspensive veto could occur only if a 2/3 majority of repn'!sentarives 
weighed some law differently. 
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14. Party of Democratic Action 
15. Party of Middeleuropean Action 
16. Croatian Democratic Party · COP 
17. Christian People's Party - CPP 
18. Dalmatian Action - DA 
19. Croatian Republican Union - CRU 
20. Croatian Party · CP 
21. lstrian Liberal Party - !LP 
22. lstrian People's Party · lPP 
23. Istrian Independent Party 
24. Social Democratic Party of Croatia - SDPC 
25. Homtlandly Civil Party - HCP 
26. Croatian Democratic Party of Rights 
• ' r ... 
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Table l. ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE CHAMBER OF COUNTU~S OF 
THE SABOR OF THE REPUBUC OF CROATIA 
Total 
number Percentage of 
of VOil!S Voters Perceru of Non-valid Constituency (coumy) in the votes (%) UallotS non-valid rumour ballo!s (%) 
electoral 
register 
I. Zagrcba&a 129.913 10L758 78 3.469 3.41 
n. Kra~Zagotska 116.256 80.525 fB 2'l77 3.70 
Dl. Sisa&o-Moslava&a 205.189 104.405 51 3.422 3.28 
N . Karlova&a 130.210 72749 56 2313 3.18 
V. Varaidinska 144.529 102.917 71 3.623 3.52 
Vt KoprivniCko-l<riZeva&a 100.425 74.063 74 2474 3.34 
Vll. B_jelovarsko.Bilogor:ska 99.82.8 80.057 00 3.171 3.96 
vm. Primorsko-Goranska 261.158 174335 67 5.596 3.21 
lX. LiC.ko-Senjska 47.761 31.302 66 1.124 3.59 
X. V'U"Oviti&o-Podtavska 70.945 57.283 81 2.642 4.61 
XL PofeY<o-Siavooska 86.946 66.131 76 2102 3.18 
)01. Brodsko-Posavska 120.804 83.876 (I} 3.322 3.96 
Xlll. Zadarsko-l<ninska 197.369 61.716 31 1.912 3.10 
XIV. Osje&o-Baranj;l<a 256.075 140.604 ss 4.613 3.28 
XV. Sibenskn 79.954 47.()82 59 1.970 4.18 
XVI. Vukovarsko-Srijemska 110.743 67.021 61 2.129 3,18 
iXVIL SpW.ko-Dalmatinslca 360.752 225.806 63 8.29'1 3.67 
xvm. lstarska 159.502 118.823 74 3.980 3.35 
iXJX. Dubrova&o-NeretvanSial 96.387 64423 67 2.307 3.58 
XX. Medimurska 89.878 64.590 7l 2321 3.59 
poa. Grad Zagreb ns.m 484.316 68 12258 2.53 
100 
Table 2. ELECTION RP..SULTS IN COUNIY ZAGREBACKA 
Party vores mandates mandates (%) (%) 
CDU 48.1 66.66 2 
CPP 29.51 33.33 1 
-
CSLP 19.02 0 0 
SDP 2.21 0 0 
suu 0.78 0 0 
-
CPNL 0.37 0 0 
Table 3. ELEcnON RESULTS IN COUN'TY KRAPINSKO-ZAGORSKA 
Pany mtes (%) mandates manda.tes (%) 
<DJ 585 66.66 2 
CSIP/ CP'sP/SDP 21.87 33.33 1 
m> 19.61 0 0 
101 
Table 4. ELECfiON RESULTS IN COUNTY SISACKO-MOSLAVACKA 
Party votes (%) mandates mandates (%) 
CDU 55.34 66.66 2 
CSLP 30.05 33.3·3 1 
CPP 13.28 0 0 
CPNL 1.34 0 0 
Table 5. ELECTION RESULTS lN COUNTY KARLOVACKA 
Party votes (%) mandates mandates (%) 
CDU 60.43 66.66 2 
CSLP/CP'sP 27.54 33.33 1 
CPP 6.7 0 0 
SDU 5.33 0 0 
Table 6. ELECITON RESULTS lN COUNlY VARAZDINSKA 
Party votes (%) mandat mandates (%) 
CDU 39.29 33.33 1 
CSLP/CP'sP /SDP /HKDU 33.5 33.33 1 
CPP 26.1 33.33 1 
CPNL 1.09 0 0 
102 
Table 7. ELECTION Rl::SULTS rN COUNTY KOPRIVN!CKO KRIZEVACKA 
Pany votes (%) mandat I (%) mandates 
39.56 3~ 
31.6 33.33 l 
26.51 33.33 1 
CCDP 2.28 0 0 
Table 8. ELECTION RESULTS lN COUN1Y B.JELOVARSKO.BILOGORSKA 
..--
Parry votes (%) mandat mandates (%) 
CDU 44.06 33.33 1 
CPP 26.56 33.33 1 
CSLP 26.25 33.33 1 
CCDP 3. !3 0 0 
·-
Table 9. ELECflON R~ULTS lN COUNTY PRJMORSJ<O-GORANSKA 
Pany votes (%) mandu man dates (%) 
CDU 35.4 66.66 2 
CSLP 29 . 16 33 .33 1 
IDA/RDA 13.51 0 0 
SDP 12.2 7 0 0 
CP'sP 2 . 39 0 0 
·-
CPP 2.35 0 0 
CCDP 2.29 0 0 
-
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Table 10. EU:CDON RESULTS IN COUN1Y LICKO-SENJSKA 
-
Party votes (%) mandat mandares (%) 
-
CDU 74 .69 100 3 
CSLP 18.84 0 0 
CPP 6.46 0 0 
Table 11. ELEcriON RESULTS IN COUNTY VlROVITICKO-PODRAVSKA 
Party votes (%) m and at mandates (%) 
-
CDU 49.35 66.66 2 
CPP 27.59 33.33 1 
CSLP 23.06 0 0 
-
Table 12. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUN'TY POZESKO-SLAVONSKA 
-
Party votes (%) mandar mandates (%) 
CDU 54.5 66.66 2 
CSLP 24.55 33.33 1 
CPP 8 .6 0 0 
f--
CCDP 6.54 0 0 
CP'sP 3.5 0 0 
SPS 2.28 0 0 
-
104 
Table 13. ELECfiON RESULTS IN COUN1Y BRODSKO-POSAVSKA 
Party VOles (%) mandar mandates (%) 
CDU 50.72 66.66 2 
- ·- --·-
CSLP/SDP 26.6 33.33 1 
·-
independents 10.36 0 0 
--- - --1---- 1--
CPP 8.65 0 0 
CCDP/CP'sP 3.59 0 0 
Table 14. ELECTION RESULTS IN COUN1Y ZADARSKO-I<NTNSKA 
Pany votes (%) mandat mandates (%) 
- - - ---- - f-.-
CDU 61.62 66.66 2 
CSLP 23.49 33.33 1 
CP'sP 7.61 0 0 
SDP/CPP 3.06 0 0 
independents 2.41 0 0 
CCDU 1.38 0 0 
:--
PDA 0.48 0 0 
Oeren-AIIIoljak. S .. 8~otiot\!l In (:rOIItl• -·• CPSrl, Vol 30. Nu. 2. 1993, pp 00.110 105 
Table JS. ELECriON RESULTS IN COUNTI OSJECKO-BARANJSKA 
~ 
P.ury votes (%) manual m<'l ndat es (%) 
CDU 51.4 66 . 66 2 
CSLP 35.41 33 . 33 l 
CPP 5 .7 0 0 
CP'sP 3 .33 0 0 
-
SPS 2 . 12 0 0 
CCDU 1.53 0 0 
SEA 0 .51 0 0 
Table 16. ELEcriON RESULTS IN COUNTY SIBENSKA 
Parry votes (%) m and at m a ndates ( % ) 
CDU 52.6 66 . 66 2 
t-- -
CSLP 30.14 33 . 33 1 
CP'sP/ SDP 10.33 0 0 
CPP 3 .8 0 0 
CCDI)/CDP/CbPP 3.13 0 0 
Table 17. ELECllON RESULTS IN COUNTI VUKOVARSKO-SRUEMSKA 
Pany votes (%) mandat mandates (%) 
CDU 62.54 66.66 2 
r--
CSLP 25.45 33.33 1 
CPP 10.05 0 0 
-
SDP 1.96 0 0 
106 
Table 18. ELECTION RESULtS lN COUN1Y SPLITSKO-DALMATINSKA 
r--
P:t1ty votes (%) mandat munda (%) tes 
---
CDU 44 . 1 6 6Ci. 66 2 
f-- --
CSLP 28.5 33 33 1 
DA 10. 1 9 0 0 
SDP/ SPC 7 . 58 0 0 
1-
C PP 6 . 24 0 0 
CC DU/C RU /C hPP 1.94 0 0 
CP 0 .65 0 0 
-
CPNl 0 51 0 0 
Table 19. ELECTION Rf:.SULTS IN COUNlY lSTARSKA 
r- --- -
Party \'OlCS (q.?) m nuda! m:~ndares (%) 
f-- · 
- -
IDA 66.42 100 3 
r-- ---
CDU 16. 35 0 0 
CSLP 11.15 0 0 
1- --- -
ILP 2.0 0 0 
f--- · 
SDP/SPC/SDC 1.91 0 0 
f-- ----
ChPP 1.47 0 0 
~ 
CPP 1.22 0 0 
CPNL 0.48 0 0 
·-
---~- ----
1ab/e 20. ELECTION RESULTS 1N COUNTY DUBROVACKO 
NERE'IVANSKA 
.-------·- r----- - r---
---
Parry votes (%) mandat mandates (%) 
----·-1------r---
---CDU 46.02 66.66 2 
--
·- ---- 1------CSLP 25.62 33.33 1 
--·- 1---- - 1-----
SDP 6.77 0 0 
t-- -- -----·-t--
DA 6.65 0 0 
CPP 5.74 0 0 
·- !-
CCDU/ CCDP/ CDP 5.65 0 0 
·-independents 3.5 0 0 
Table 21. ELECTION RESULTS lN COUNTY MEDIMURSKA 
--
Party vote:; (%) m and at mandates (%) 
1---
CSLP/CP'sP 
·12.17 66.66 2 
CDU 33.07 33.33 1 
CPP 17.01 0 0 
ChPP 4.61 0 0 




Table 22. F.LEcrJON RESULTS IN COUNlY CRAD ZACREB 
r----
I ""... (%) Party mandat mandates (%) 
·-
CDU 4:2.57 66.66 2 
CSLP 32.16 33.33 l 
-
CPP 10.03 0 0 
-
SDP 2.88 0 0 
CCDU 2.61 0 0 
sou 2.32 0 0 
SPP 1.56 0 0 
independents (1) 1.54 0 0 
-
CDPR 1 .4~ 0 0 
·-
DGS 0.66 0 0 
CPNL 0.54 0 0 
PDA 0.42 0 0 
independents (2) 0.38 0 0 
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Figure 2. THE HF.LATIONSHJP BETWEEN VOTES AND MANDATES ON 
THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
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